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I. FOUNDING PRINCIPLES OF THE JUVENILE COURT 
Juvenile court was created to address the differences between 
adults and children.  The juvenile justice system focused more on 
rehabilitating children, rather than punishing them.1  To achieve 
this goal, judges in juvenile court were granted discretion to 
consider an individual child’s development and social and 
psychological situation when designing the response best 
calculated to correct that child’s behavior and address its causes.2 
Juvenile court founders believed that there was a greater 
 
       †   Lisa McNaughton is the Managing Attorney for Juvenile Court in the 
Hennepin County–Fourth Judicial District Public Defenders’ Office.  She is a 
graduate of William Mitchell College of Law where she served on the editorial 
board of the William Mitchell Law Review.  The author was assisted in the creation of 
this article by Elizabeth Dilks.  Elizabeth is in her final year at the University of 
Minnesota Law School and is employed as a law clerk in the Public Defenders’ 
Office. 
 1. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967) (noting that the idealistic 
reformists who conceived of the juvenile system believed that “[t]he child was to 
be ‘treated’ and ‘rehabilitated’ and the procedures, from apprehension through 
institutionalization, were to be ‘clinical’ rather than punitive”); Julian W. Mack, 
The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909); Lisa Ells, Note, Juvenile 
Psychopathy: The Hollow Promise of Prediction, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 158, 160 (2005). 
 2. Ells, supra note 1, at 160-61; see MARTIN L. FORST, THE NEW JUVENILE 
JUSTICE 1, 2 (1995). 
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opportunity to rehabilitate children and that children should not 
be punished for their actions in the same manner as adults because 
they were less blameworthy than adults.3  This belief existed since at 
least the seventeenth century.4  English common law provided an 
infancy defense for children under the age of seven and a 
rebuttable presumption of irresponsibility for youths under the age 
of fourteen.5  At the same time, however, the treatment of juveniles 
was harsh and devoid of procedural protections.6  By the time the 
first juvenile court was established in 1899,7 reducing the harsh 
treatment of juveniles, studies in the emerging science of child 
development supported the idea that juveniles are less culpable for 
their actions than adults.8  Rather than treating similarly situated 
juveniles alike, the juvenile system’s founders aimed to consider 
each child as an individual and to tailor a treatment plan to his or 
her needs with the goal of breaking the cycle of crime before it set 
in. 
It became clear by the mid-1960s that state juvenile systems fell 
short of these goals.9  Juvenile courts were unable to offer sufficient 
individualized treatment to each child due to their heavy 
caseloads10 and budget shortfalls.  Instead, most juvenile treatment 
facilities were factory-like and failed to provide follow-up treatment 
to prevent recidivism11 because purely punitive solutions were 
easier to apply.  Juvenile courts offered few procedural safeguards 
 
 3. See Ells, supra note 1, at 162; Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis The Menace or Billy 
The Kid: An Analysis of the Role of Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 371, 375 (1998) (stating that the reforms leading to a separate court 
for juveniles “stemmed from a belief that children should not be held to the same 
level of accountability as adults because they were not fully responsible for their 
actions”). 
 4. Klein, supra note 3, at 375. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Randall G. Shelden & Michelle Hussong, Juvenile Crime, Adult 
Adjudication and the Death Penalty: Draconian Policies Revisited, JUST. POL’Y J., Spring 
2003, at 1, 7, http://www.cjcj.org/pdf/shelden_hussong.pdf (describing the 
treatment of child offenders in early U.S. jurisprudence). 
 7. Mack, supra note 1, at 107; Ells, supra note 1, at 160. 
 8. Ells, supra note 1, at 162; David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer out 
of the Juvenile Court, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 13, 17 (Jeffrey 
Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000). 
 9. C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater: Adolescent Offending and 
Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 659, 669 (2005). 
 10. Id.; see Jennifer M. O’Connor & Lucinda K. Treat, Getting Smart About 
Getting Tough: Juvenile Justice and the Possibility of Progressive Reform, 33 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1299, 1303 (1996). 
 11. Clarke, supra note 9, at 669; O’Connor & Treat, supra note 10, at 1303. 
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to assure that guilt was clearly established before consequences 
were imposed.   
In response to the juvenile system’s failure to meet its 
rehabilitative ideals and the limited procedural protections 
afforded the accused, the U.S. Supreme Court stepped in and 
mandated that youthful offenders in the juvenile system received 
increased constitutional protections.  During the mid-1960s, the 
Court heard several cases in which it declared that juveniles were 
entitled to some of the same due process procedural safeguards as 
adults.12  Critics argue that these due process reforms transformed 
the juvenile system into a “scaled-down, second-class criminal court 
for young people”13 because the courts became more adversarial 
and formalistic in nature.14 
While juvenile court may have come to share some procedures 
and safeguards with adult criminal court since the 1960s, the 
rehabilitative goal remained a key component of the adjudication 
phase of juvenile court.  This goal, however, faced increasing 
obstacles posed by state legislators who approached juveniles 
punitively, fueled by a short-term rise in juvenile crime and media 
fascination with more disturbing, albeit isolated, cases. 
In response to the rise in violent juvenile crime between 1965 
and the early 1990s, most notably between 1987 and 1991, 
legislatures developed a more punitive approach, with little 
discretion available, to addressing juvenile offenders.15  This change 
was driven not only by the media’s sensationalist coverage of 
disturbing violent juvenile crimes, such as school shootings,16 but 
also by a political shift toward harsher punishments.  Despite the 
fact that the nationwide rate of violent juvenile crime has 
plummeted by 71% since 1993,17 legislators continue to propose 
bills which subject juveniles to unduly harsh punishments.  There 
are existing statutes that punish juveniles automatically and severely 
 
 12. Clarke, supra note 9, at 669-70; Wright S. Walling & Stacia Walling Driver, 
100 Years of Juvenile Court in Minnesota—A Historical Overview and Perspective, 32 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 883, 902-04 (2006); see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
 13. BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE 
COURT 287 (1999). 
 14. Clarke, supra note 9, at 673. 
 15. Id. at 674. 
 16. Id. at 674-75. 
 17. FORUM ON FAMILY & CHILD STATISTICS, YOUTH VICTIMS AND PERPETRATORS 
OF SERIOUS VIOLENT CRIME (2005), http://www.childstats.gov/americaschildren/ 
beh4.asp. 
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despite the fact that the juvenile violent crime rate has fallen.  Such 
statutes not only fail to consider the purposes of the juvenile 
system, but they also expose juveniles to sentences that are not 
proportionate to their diminished culpability.  These statutes exist 
despite the fact that the science of brain development has provided 
further clarification that juvenile brains, particularly in teenage 
years, are still in developmental flux and not necessarily indicative 
of adult behavior.18  With these more punitive changes, efforts to 
redirect children to more useful lives are abandoned and the use of 
expensive and lengthy incarcerations is mandated. 
II. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT RECOGNIZES JUVENILES’ DIMINISHED 
CULPABILITY IN ROPER V. SIMMONS 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.19  The Supreme Court has 
implemented this concept by applying a comparison between 
culpability and punishment.  The Eighth Amendment 
proportionality analysis requires an examination not only of a 
crime’s gravity, but also of a defendant’s culpability.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court explained that the Eighth Amendment guarantees 
individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions in 
proportion to their culpability.20  In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court 
held that subjecting mentally retarded adults to the death penalty 
violated the Eighth Amendment because such adults were less 
culpable for their actions than the average adult offender.21 
In 2005, the Supreme Court applied Atkins’s reasoning when 
declaring it unconstitutional to subject juveniles to the death 
penalty in Roper v. Simmons.22  Framing its Eighth Amendment 
proportionality analysis, the court in Roper referred to “‘the 
 
 18. See Joel V. Oberstar, Elise M. Anderson & Jonathan B. Jensen, Cognative 
and Moral Development, Brain Development, and Mental Illness: Important Considerations 
for the Juvenile Justice System, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1051 (2006); Laurence 
Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental 
Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 1009 (2003); see also Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, 
(Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable than 
Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741, 756 (2000); Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ 
Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial 
Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 335 (2003). 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 20. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002). 
 21. Id. at 319. 
 22. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). 
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evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society’ to determine which punishments are so disproportionate as 
to be cruel and unusual.”23  By evaluating recent sociological and 
scientific data, the Court cited three fundamental differences 
between juveniles and adults that rendered juveniles less culpable 
for their actions.24  First, youth tend to possess “‘[a] lack of maturity 
and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility . . . [which] result in 
impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.’”25  Second, 
juveniles are “more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences 
and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”26  Finally, a 
juvenile’s character is “not as well formed as that of an adult.”27  
Rather, juveniles’ personality traits are “more transitory” and “less 
fixed” than those of adults.28 
Based on these differences, the Supreme Court in Roper 
concluded that juveniles’ irresponsible conduct was less morally 
reprehensible than that of adults.29  In addition, the fact that a 
majority of states had rejected the juvenile death penalty provided 
“sufficient evidence [to the Court] that today our society views 
juveniles . . . as ‘categorically less culpable than the average 
criminal.’”30  The Court declared the death penalty to be a 
disproportionate punishment for all juvenile offenders under the 
age of eighteen because juveniles’ “culpability or blameworthiness 
is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and 
immaturity.”31  Due to the “marked” differences between juvenile 
and adult offenders, the Court found that juveniles should be 
subjected to less severe sentences than adults for the same crimes.32 
Though the holding in Roper only addressed capital 
punishment of juveniles, the Supreme Court has noted that the 
Eighth Amendment proportionality principle also applies to 
noncapital sentences.33  Thus, Roper’s rationale should be applied to 
any situation in which juveniles are subjected to harsh punishments 
 
 23. Id. at 1190 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958)). 
 24. Id. at 1195. 
 25. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 1186 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)). 
 30. Id. at 1194 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002)). 
 31. Id. at 1196. 
 32. Id. at 1197. 
 33. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997-98 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
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that are disproportionate to the juveniles’ levels of culpability. 
III. AUTOMATIC CERTIFICATION IN MINNESOTA 
A juvenile over the age of sixteen could always be certified and 
tried as an adult if the evidence revealed that this was the proper 
path.34  Now, however, a juvenile must be certified as an adult if 
charged with certain offenses.35  In Minnesota, there are several 
situations in which a juvenile is automatically subjected to 
sentences that are just as severe as that of an adult without taking 
his or her diminished culpability into account.  For instance, 
Minnesota Statutes section 260B.007, subdivision 6(b) explicitly 
excludes “a child alleged to have committed murder in the first 
degree after becoming 16 years of age” from its definition of a 
“delinquent child.”36  Furthermore, Minnesota Statutes section 
609.055, subdivision 2(b) automatically certifies “a child who is 
alleged to have committed murder in the first degree after 
becoming 16 years of age” to be prosecuted as an adult in district 
court.37  Under these statutes, once a juvenile aged sixteen or 
seventeen is accused of first-degree murder and indicted by a grand 
jury, he or she is automatically subject to adult court’s jurisdiction 
without a hearing in juvenile court and is thus treated identically to 
an adult.38 
This rule gives rise to two problems.  First, the child, without 
any examination of his or her maturity or the complexity of the 
surrounding circumstances, is treated as an adult.  Second, this 
determination is made based on the allegation, not the ultimate 
finding as to what the crime truly was.39  Picture a real-life situation 
in which these two statutes apply: A sixteen-year-old is accused of 
first-degree murder.  He is indicted by a grand jury, which finds 
that probable cause supports this charge.  Without a hearing, he 
goes to trial in adult court.  The jury finds him not guilty of the 
original charge that caused him to be deemed an adult, but guilty 
of a lesser charge of manslaughter, which would not automatically 
have sent him to adult court.  Since he has been tried in adult 
court, he is subjected to adult punishment, which includes 
 
 34. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.125 (1998); MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 18.02. 
 35. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 609.055, subd. 2(b), 260B.007, subd. 6(b) (2004). 
 36. Id. § 260B.007, subd. 6(b). 
 37. Id. § 609.055, subd. 2(b). 
 38. Id. §§ 260B.007, subd. 6(b), 609.055, subd. 2(b). 
 39. Id. § 260B.007, subd. 6(b). 
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incarceration in prison with adults and an adult conviction on his 
record. 
By contrast, a sixteen-year-old who was correctly charged with 
manslaughter to begin with, absent a showing that he should be 
certified as an adult40 or given Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile 
status,41 would be subject to a juvenile court’s jurisdiction.42  Once 
he has been tried in juvenile court and found guilty of 
manslaughter, the judge sentences him to a punishment that is 
calculated to maximize the chances that the unlawful behavior will 
stop.  If incarceration is appropriate, he will be detained in juvenile 
facilities and will receive treatment in programs designated for 
juveniles.  His adjudication will not go on his record permanently; 
rather, it will be treated as a juvenile adjudication. 
When comparing the different fates of these two similarly 
situated juveniles, the flaw in the automatic certification statutes is 
apparent.  These statutes subject certain juveniles to much harsher 
penalties than other similarly situated juveniles merely for what 
they were charged with, rather than for what they actually did. 
IV.  THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT POSITION PRIOR TO ROPER 
AND ATKINS 
In State v. Behl, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld one of 
these automatic certification statutes43 as constitutional.44  The 
statute automatically waives the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over 
juveniles sixteen and seventeen years old who have been indicted 
for first-degree murder.45 
The Atkins and Roper rationale calls the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s holding in State v. Behl into question.  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court decided Behl five years before Atkins46 and eight 
years before Roper,47 which the U.S. Supreme Court decided in 
2005.  The court’s reasoning in Behl fails to consider juveniles’ 
diminished culpability as a factor in its proportionality analysis, as 
the Supreme Court declared was necessary in Roper.48  Instead, the 
 
 40. See id. § 260B.125. 
 41. See id. § 260B.130. 
 42. See id. § 260B.101, subd. 1. 
 43. Id. § 260.015 (repealed 1999) (current version at § 260B.007 (2004)). 
 44. State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560, 567-68 (Minn. 1997). 
 45. MINN. STAT. § 260.015 (1998). 
 46. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002). 
 47. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). 
 48. Id. at 1186. 
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court in Behl based its holding on the idea that “juveniles over the 
age of 16 who have undertaken conduct sufficient to invoke an 
indictment for first-degree murder, are more dangerous and less 
amenable to the treatment provided by the juvenile system.”49   
Obviously, in some cases this is true, but the ordinary 
certification process would find such juveniles in adult court 
anyway.  Often, however, it is not true.  The “automatic” nature of 
the rule conflicts with the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Roper, 
for it merely considers the seriousness of the crime with which the 
juvenile is charged, while neglecting to take the three fundamental 
cognitive differences between juveniles and adults into account.  In 
Behl, the Minnesota Supreme Court allowed the legislature to usurp 
what was traditionally the court’s authority, taking the now-
discredited approach of allowing automatic certification to replace 
individualized decision making.50 
There is no denying the gravity of first-degree murder 
allegations.  However, a juvenile accused of this crime should not 
be subjected to automatic certification in adult court.  Instead, such 
a juvenile should be entitled to the juvenile court’s individualized 
determination of whether adult or juvenile court is the appropriate 
venue.  This may often result in the juvenile being certified to adult 
court because past or present behavior reveals it to be the 
appropriate response, but that will not always be the case. 
In a recent case, the Arizona Supreme Court held that an 
Arizona automatic filing scheme violated the Eighth Amendment 
on the same proportionality ground explained in Roper.51  Like the 
Minnesota statute at issue in Behl, the Arizona scheme automatically 
subjected a juvenile to adult court jurisdiction when he or she was 
accused of first-degree murder.52  The Arizona court cited an 
earlier U.S. Supreme Court decision, Stanford v. Kentucky,53 which 
had allowed juvenile certification because of the fact that those 
states’ juvenile courts had conducted individualized consideration 
of each juvenile’s maturity and moral responsibility as a 
precondition to transfer to adult court.54 
Similar to the unconstitutional Arizona statute, Minnesota 
 
 49. Behl, 564 N.W.2d at 568. 
 50. See id. 
 51. State v. Davolt, 84 P.3d 456, 480-81 (Ariz. 2004). 
 52. Id. at 879. 
 53. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 54. Davolt, 84 P.3d at 480 (citing Stanford, 492 U.S. at 375-76). 
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Statutes sections 260B.007 and 609.055 automatically certify a 
juvenile as an adult once he or she is accused of first-degree 
murder.55  In light of the recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, as well as other courts, it seems likely that Minnesota courts 
will declare these statutes unconstitutional if they are not changed, 
for they automatically subject juveniles to punishments potentially 
disproportionate to their culpability without the opportunity for a 
certification hearing in juvenile court. 
A juvenile court is uniquely situated to determine whether a 
juvenile has sufficient culpability, when considering all relevant 
factors, to be certified as an adult.  In Minnesota, juvenile courts 
routinely evaluate several factors in making this decision including: 
(A) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of 
community protection, including the existence of any 
aggravating factors recognized by the Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines, the use of a firearm, and the 
impact on any victim; 
(B) the culpability of the child in committing the alleged 
offense, including the level of the child’s participation in 
planning and carrying out the offense and the existence 
of any mitigating factors recognized by the Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines; 
(C) the child’s prior record of delinquency; 
(D) the child’s programming history, including the child’s 
past willingness to participate meaningfully in available 
programming; 
(E) the adequacy of the punishment or programming 
available in the juvenile justice system; 
(F) the dispositional options available for the child.56 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the juvenile court’s 
expertise in deciding whether a juvenile should be subjected to 
adult court’s jurisdiction.57  In Kent v. United States, the Court ruled 
that a juvenile is entitled to due process and fair treatment in any 
hearing, including a hearing for transfer to adult court.58  
According to the Supreme Court in Kent, a juvenile is entitled to a 
hearing in which the juvenile court considers his or her special 
 
 55. MINN. STAT. §§ 260B.007, subd. 6(b), 609.055, subd. 2(b) (2004). 
 56. MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 18.06, subd. 3. 
 57. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 564 (1966). 
 58. Id. at 562. 
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needs and the individual circumstances of his or her alleged crime 
on a case-by-case basis in order to preserve his or her due process 
rights.59  Because Minnesota’s automatic certification statutes deny 
juveniles any hearing whatsoever, these statutes deny juveniles due 
process, as well as subject them to unduly harsh punishments in 
adult court.  In light of these cases and the legal concepts they 
explain, Minnesota’s highest court should declare the automatic 
treatment unconstitutional. 
V. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION 
When juveniles are accused of any of a wide variety of sex 
offenses, they face another scenario in which they are treated as 
adults and are thereby disproportionately punished.  Minnesota’s 
sex offender registration law requires juveniles accused of or 
adjudicated delinquent for any level of sex offense to register as sex 
offenders.  Minnesota Statutes section 243.166 requires a person to 
register if “the person was charged with or petitioned for a felony 
violation of or attempt to violate any [degree of criminal sexual 
conduct] and convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for that offense or 
another offense arising out of the same set of circumstances.”60 
Picture another scenario: At his belated sixteenth birthday 
party, a sixteen-year-old male and a thirteen-year-old female kiss.  
She lifts her shirt and he brushes against her breasts.  Her incensed 
parent reports this to the police.  The police come to the party and 
arrest him for fourth degree sexual conduct.  When they attempt to 
put him in handcuffs, he resists, yelling that he does not want to go 
to jail.  He is charged with disorderly conduct in addition to the 
first offense.  In juvenile court, the sixteen-year-old pleads guilty to 
disorderly conduct, and is adjudicated delinquent for that offense, 
but not for the charge of criminal sexual conduct.  However, his 
probation officer tells him that he must register as a sex offender 
for the next ten years because he was convicted of an offense 
arising from the same circumstances as the charge of fourth degree 
criminal sexual conduct.  In response, he diligently registers with 
the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension.  Several years later, he 
 
 59. Id. at 554-55. 
 60. MINN. STAT. § 243.166, subd. 1(b)(1) (emphasis added).  The statute 
provides that the person “required to register under this section shall continue to 
comply with this section until ten years have elapsed since the person initially 
registered in connection with the offense, or until the probation, supervised 
release, or conditional release period expires, whichever occurs later.”  Id. subd. 6. 
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forgets to register.  He then receives a court summons to answer to 
a felony charge of failure to register. 
This young man’s behavior certainly did not pose a danger to 
the public like the violent sex crimes that the Minnesota 
Legislature envisioned when it passed the registration statute.  His 
behavior was worthy of scolding from a parent and, at worst, a 
juvenile court intervention.  This behavior did not deviate sharply 
from normative, exploratory sexual behavior for many people his 
age who have no criminal propensity.  This person, however, will 
suffer the long-term consequences of being a registered sex 
offender. 
Sex offenders suffer grave collateral consequences due to this 
registration requirement.  Like many other states, Minnesota’s 
registration statute sweeps broadly by including juveniles who have 
committed relatively minor offenses. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is important to remember that when addressing the unique 
social, physiological, and brain development realities of juveniles, 
deterrence, justice, and public safety61 must be “pursued through 
means that are fair and just, that recognize the unique 
characteristics and needs of children, and that give children access 
to opportunities for personal and social growth.”62  This serves the 
long-term interests of public safety, fairness, and the sensible 
administration of justice. 
 
 61. “The purpose of the laws relating to children alleged or adjudicated to be 
delinquent is to promote the public safety and reduce juvenile delinquency by 
maintaining the integrity of the substantive law prohibiting certain behavior and 
by developing individual responsibility for lawful behavior.”  MINN. STAT. 
§ 260B.001, subd. 2. 
 62. Id. 
11
McNaughton: Extending Roper's Reasoning to Minnesota's Juvenile Justice Syste
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006
